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Heavyweight Bots in the Clouds: The Wrong 
Incentives and Poorly Crafted Balances That 
Lead to the Blocking of Information Online 
By Anjanette H. Raymond* 
 
The United States and the European Union have long recognized the need to protect ISPs 
from potential liability from customers using their services to infringe intellectual 
property rights.  These protections arise from a long-standing belief that intellectual 
property right holders should bear the burden of protecting their property, even in the 
quick moving Internet environment.  However, a recent series of cases has called into 
question the ISPs’ liability protections as their technology is often the only real means to 
prevent wide scale infringing activity.  This series has caused courts to revisit ISPs’ 
liability and to impose a ‘cooperative burden’ requiring ISPs to assist in the protection of 
intellectual property rights.  In creating this burden, the ISPs and right holders have 
reacted by working together to craft technology advances that identify infringing 
activities.  However, the technology is not yet ready for wide scale use and is often 
accompanied by policies that encourage the over-identification of material that should 
never be considered infringing.  The over-identification is even more troubling in the face 
of automatic blocking activities that allow entities to claim material that is not part of 
their intellectual property portfolio.  This activity is preventing communication, 
blocking the dissemination of information, and sometimes holding rightful owners of the 
material hostage to the automatic bot shut down activities.  Simply put, this new 
cooperative burden is creating an odd set of incentives with no regard for individual 
internet users’ rights.  
 
 
This paper will consider incentives created under the law for ISPs to over-protect 
intellectual property rights.  The paper will then consider the creation of an appropriate 
balance between stakeholders within the online world—one that re-evaluates the priority 
given to right holders and instead truly balances the burden of protecting intellectual 
property in the online world.  Finally, the paper will suggest that the law must be 
reconsidered in light of the new technologies being employed by ISPs and intellectual 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  On August 6, 2012, NASA broadcasted online one of the scientific, technological, 
and educational highlights of the decade when it live streamed the landing of its Mars 
rover Curiosity.  Curiosity had traveled hundreds of millions of miles through space to 
explore the red planet.1  The online broadcast marked the first time that such a stunning 
display of the red planet had been seen live by millions of interested parties worldwide.  
With technology and human know-how on worldwide display, the achievement was 
simply remarkable.  But unfortunately, another technology—one a little closer to home—
would, in the end, grab the headlines, as online video highlights of the landing would be 
blocked from public view for copyright reasons.  
¶2  NASA has long hosted a video stream featuring video highlights and educational 
programs on various NASA-related projects.  No one could have anticipated that the 
posting of the Curiosity landing on NASA’s YouTube channel would cause any trouble 
or controversy.2  But soon after NASA posted the thirteen-minute excerpt, the video was 
blocked by YouTube copyright technology.3  Despite the fact that NASA produced the 
 
1
 See Elizabeth Landau, Mars Landing Went 'Flawlessly,' Scientists Say, CNN (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/06/tech/mars-rover-curiosity/index.html.  
2
 The NASA television channel is available at http://www.youtube.com/nasatelevision. 
3
 See Timothy B. Lee, As Curiosity Touches Down on Mars, Video Is Taken Down from YouTube, ARS 
TECHNICA (Aug. 6, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/as-curiosity-touches-down-on-mars-
video-is-taken-down-from-youtube/. 
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video and had every right to broadcast it online, the video activated a warning within the 
YouTube copyright identification system resulting in the video being blocked for 
“copyright reasons.”  As MotherBoard author Alex Pasternack noted:  
[A] NASA-made public domain video posted on NASA’s official YouTube 
channel, documenting the landing of a $2.5 billion Mars rover mission paid for 
with public taxpayer money, was blocked by YouTube because of a copyright 
claim by a private news service.
4
  
YouTube shortly restored the video, but the irony was clear.  The video had been 
identified and disabled via the use of an automated identification technology employed 
within the YouTube system.  In fact, the NASA video was blocked again a few days later 
when a commentator used a series of splashes from the video to highlight his discussion 
about the landing.5  This particular blocking occurred despite NASA notifying the 
technology manager that the video was within the public domain and should never be 
blocked. 
¶3  As emphasized by NASA spokesperson Bob Jacobs and highlighted by 
Parker Higgins: 
We spend too much time going through the administrative process to clear videos 
slapped with needless copyright claims. . . . YouTube seems to be missing a 
‘common sense’ button to its processes, especially when it involves public 
domain material paid for by the American taxpayer.
6
 
Technology is being employed to assist copyright holders and service providers in 
identifying and blocking media identified as copyright infringing material.  Yet the 
technology is over-identifying and over-blocking media that should not be blocked, and 
as demonstrated by the NASA YouTube video, it seems that there is little to no human 
oversight.  
¶4  Because the Mars landing was an after-the-fact video that was quickly restored 
after being blocked, we may assume that this is a limited example.  Unfortunately, it is 
not.  In fact, media blocking occurs even when the event is live or is displaying a video 
demanding immediate release, such as a political rally or social commentary.  For 
example, videos from both the Hugo Science Fiction Award ceremony and the 
Democratic National Convention were disabled as a result of the implementation of 
similar digital fingerprinting technology.7  The Hugo Science Fiction Award ceremony is 
 
4
 Alex Pasternack, NASA's Mars Rover Crashed into a DMCA Takedown, VICE MAGAZINE 
MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 6, 2012), http://motherboard.vice.com/2012/8/6/nasa-s-mars-rover-crashed-into-a-
dmca-takedown.  
5
 See Timothy B. Lee, How YouTube Lets Content Companies "Claim" NASA Mars Videos, ARS 
TECHNICA (Aug. 8, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/how-youtube-lets-content-
companies-claim-nasa-mars videos/. 
6
 Parker Higgins, Mars Landing Videos, and Other Casualties of the Robot Wars, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 8, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/mars-landing-videos-and-
other-casualties-robot-wars.  
7
 See Annalee Newitz, How Copyright Enforcement Robots Killed the Hugo Awards, I09 (Sept. 3, 2012, 
10:25 AM), http://io9.com/5940036/how-copyright-enforcement-robots-killed-the-hugo-awards; Ryan 
Singel, YouTube Flags Democrats’ Convention Video on Copyright Grounds, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2012, 12:10 
AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/youtube-flags-democrats-convention-video-on-copyright-
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a prestigious award ceremony for science fiction.
 8  One of the main ways that Sci-Fi fans 
watch the awards is through the use of the streaming service Ustream,9 which broadcasts 
the ceremony live. This year, during Neil Gaiman’s acceptance speech for his Doctor 
Who script, "The Doctor's Wife," the video stream was blocked and replaced with the 
message "Worldcon banned due to copyright infringement."10  Unsurprisingly, the award 
ceremony had shown video clips of portions of “The Doctor’s Wife” as a lead-in to the 
speech.  These video clips—ones provided by the studio and fully authorized to be used 
in the ceremony—had set off the digital restriction management technology employed by 
Ustream.11  The fully authorized use of a video had shut down the online streaming video 
of one of the most prestigious Science Fiction Awards and had done so during an award 
for Doctor Who.  Even worse, the award ceremony video could not be restored, so the 
public was blocked from seeing the ceremony.12 
¶5  Even more concerning are events surrounding the blocking of the live stream of the 
2012 Democratic National Convention.13  On September 4, 2012, the DNC posted on 
YouTube, an official streaming partner, several videos of speeches and other highlights 
of the DNC’s evening events, all of which were featured prominently on 
BarackObama.com and the YouTube channel DemConvention2012.  Some portion of the 
DNC video triggered the YouTube digital fingerprinting system, and as a result, 
YouTube put a copyright blocking message on the livestream video.  The message that 
appeared instead of the video is clear:  
This video contains content from WMG, SME, Associated Press (AP), UMG, 
Dow Jones, New York Times Digital, The Harry Fox Agency, Inc. (HFA), 
Warner Chappell, UMPG Publishing and EMI Music Publishing, one or more of 
whom have blocked it in your country on copyright grounds.  Sorry about that.
14
 
The notice indicates that numerous agencies and publishing groups are potentially 
claiming copyright concerning a video that the DNC created and clearly had rights to 
broadcast and rebroadcast.  The ability of non-holders of copyrighted material to claim 
video as part of an intellectual property rights portfolio is possibly the most concerning 




 See Newitz, supra note 7; Will Oremus, Sci-Fi Awards Webcast Shut Down by Rogue Copyright Bots 
That Refuse To Obey Human Commands, SLATE (Sept. 4, 2012, 4:21 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/09/04/hugo_awards_ustream_science_fiction_webcast_bloc
ked_by_rogue_copyright_bots.html; Zachary Knight, Copyright Enforcement Bots Seek And Destroy Hugo 
Awards, TECHDIRT (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120903/18505820259/copyright-
enforcement-bots-seek-destroy-hugo-awards.shtml. 
9
 The Ustream service is a ‘broadcast yourself’ service, similar to YouTube.  It is available at 
http://www.ustream.tv/new. 
10




 At the time, Ustream used Vobile, a third-party service that does automated infringement takedowns.  
Shortly after the ceremony, Ustream claimed it could not restart its own live feed once Vobile had shut it 
down.  Knight, supra note 9.  
13
 See Singel, supra note 7; Geeta Dayal, The Algorithmic Copyright Cops: Streaming Video’s Robotic 
Overlords, WIRED (Sept. 6, 2012, 6:00 AM) http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/streaming-videos-
robotic-overlords-algorithmic-copyright-cops.  
14
 See Singel, supra note 7. 
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[T]here has been a dramatic rise in Content ID abuse in the past couple of years, 
wielded in ways never intended.  Scammers are using Content ID to steal ad 
revenue from YouTube video creators en masse, with some companies claiming 
content they don’t own deliberately or not.  The inability to understand context 




¶6  Based on the incidents I’ve described above, it is clear that automated enforcement 
technology is not yet ready for widespread implementation.  As technology expert Parker 
Higgins notes: “It's impossibly complicated to define in a set of ‘business rules’ for 
automated [copyright] enforcement.”16  
¶7  But while the implementation of digital fingerprinting and similar technology is 
problematic, it is even more problematic that service providers are allowing and even 
encouraging its use.  Historically, service providers have protected online users from such 
troubling and problematic technology.  However, recent court cases have created a new 
online world where service providers are expected to cooperate in preventing copyright 
infringement.  As a result, service providers have begun to implement technology to 
cooperate in the effort to prevent online piracy.  Copyright holders and service providers 
have gone a step further and have created policy surrounding the technology that results 
in money being made from blocking.  The new cooperative relationship between service 
providers and copyright holders should be very troubling for online users.    
¶8  This paper will consider incentives created under the law for service providers to 
over-protect intellectual property rights.  The paper will then consider the creation of an 
appropriate balance between stakeholders within the online world—one that re-evaluates 
the priority given to right holders and instead truly balances the burden of protecting 
intellectual property in the online world.  Finally, the paper will suggest that the law must 
be reconsidered in light of the new technologies being employed by ISPs and intellectual 
property right holders in an effort to combat online piracy yet at the expense of individual 
users. 
II. A BIT OF BACKGROUND AND STAGE SETTING 
¶9  To fully understand the difficulties arising from the growing use of digital 
fingerprinting technology, a brief examination of the technology is necessary.  Digital 
fingerprinting technology is software created to identify a piece of media and relate it to 
an external database.17  The software samples an audio or video file and identifies minute 
portions of the file unique to that piece of media.18  It then compares the identified sample 
to an external database of other unique pieces of media.19  The more matches occurring 
between the two pieces of media, the more likely the media files are one in the same.  
Some digital fingerprinting technology service providers claim to be able to accurately 
 
15
  Andy Baio, Copyright Kings Are Judge, Jury and Executioner on YouTube, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2012, 
1:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/02/opinion-baiodmcayoutube. 
16
 Higgins, supra note 6. 
17
 See Wesley Fenlon, How Digital Fingerprinting Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/digital-fingerprinting2.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
18
 See id.  
19
 See id.  
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identify “across file formats, codecs, bitrates, and compression techniques”20 even when 
transformations “such as transcoding, downmixing, equalization, injected noise, 
timescaling, framedrops, grayscaling, cropping, image shifting, contrast and brightness 
adjustments, blurring, camcordering”21 have been used to create or alter the media.  If 
these claims are even partially true, digital fingerprinting technology is a serious software 
development in the fight against online piracy, as it not only identifies identical or similar 
files but is also capable of disregarding alterations of files in the matching process.  
¶10  Problems arise, however, with the policies and cost saving measures used for the 
mass rollout of this technology.  Many systems allow individual users and owners to 
upload and tag files.  As such, individuals are able to claim ownership and create 
identifiers used to flag the media.  The issue with this type of system is immediately 
apparent as individuals, without any oversight, are allowed to identify material that may 
or may not truly belong within his intellectual property right portfolio.  Consider 
statements made by Verizon Communications: 
While Verizon receives valid “notice and takedown” requests from copyright 
owners and responds promptly with the “take down” and counter-notification 
processes, we have unfortunately also experienced increasing misuses of the 
Designated Agent information located on the Copyright Office’s website.  The 
misuses fall into a variety of categories, including cases of (i) P2P and other file 
sharing activities where the material alleged to be infringed does not reside on a 
service provider’s system or network, yet ISPs are often sent automated 
“takedown” notices by the thousands; (ii) allegations of trademark infringement, 
where the DMCA “notice and takedown” provision does not apply; (iii) material 
that is protected by the “fair use” defense of the Copyright Act; and (iv) abusive 
litigation tactics made in the alarming growth of “copyright troll” lawsuits.
22
  
¶11  As a result, ISPs are being inundated with takedown requests, some legitimate and 
others disreputable attempts to restrict the use of material that is not part of the 
individuals portfolio.  In both instances, as well as numerous others, the material should 
not be removed or blocked, yet the system as designed fails to weed out these attempts to 
over-claim non-existent rights.  Even more troubling are those digital fingerprinting 
providers that allow individuals to create a response to identified media that the system 
will follow, without challenge.  For example, within some digital fingerprinting systems, 
alleged intellectual right holders are allowed to create a response to an identified media 
that blocks or monetizes the video.23  Monetization allows the right holder to elect to 
 
20
 Audible Magic Technology Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/technology.php 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
21
 Id.  
22
 Letter from Sarah B. Deutsch, Vice President and Associate General Counsel Verizon 
Communications Inc. to Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Request for Public Comment on 
Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/comments/2011/initial/verizon.pdf; see also Ke Steven Wan, 
Managing Peer-to-Peer Traffic with Digital Fingerprinting and Digital Watermarking, 41 SW. L. REV. 331 
(2012) (discussing the use of digital technology as a management device).  
23
 For example, YouTube allows the selection of monetization as a response to the posting of a 
potentially infringing video or audio file.  See YouTube Policy, Content ID, Block, Monetize, or Track 
Viewing Metrics — It's Automated, and It's Free, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last 
viewed Feb. 10, 2013). 
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allow the copyright infringing video to play with the response to identification being the 
addition of direct advertising.24  One can quickly appreciate how this system is ripe for 
abuse because there is little oversight of the digital identification system.  Similarly, 
money can be made from improperly claiming and monetizing intellectual property that 
is not actually within the individual’s (or studio’s) portfolio.   
¶12  Blocking policies also raise concerns when accompanied by little oversight.  
Consider the situation that occurred with NASA and the technology that blocked their 
video.  This blocking occurred with no check and balance, no oversight, and little 
recourse other than NASA requesting the video be re-posted.  Now, consider the same set 
of circumstances with a small change.  It is not a NASA video that is blocked, but an 
important social event such as the Democratic National Convention or the direct videos 
of police over-reactive response to an uprising.  Because digital fingerprinting technology 
relies upon individuals to upload and claim ownership of video and similar media without 
any real oversight,25 individuals can improperly claim ownership of media.  If the true 
owner fails to tag the video within the system, an unscrupulous individual or entity can 
seize upon that mistake and improperly claim ownership of the video, effectively denying 
the broadcasting of the video.  Even more concerning is the resolution of conflicts in the 
system,26 again done with no real oversight.  In this situation, the true owner could tag the 
video as part of their intellectual property portfolio, but an unscrupulous entity can also 
claim ownership.  Although the second party has no ownership, the individual has been 
able to create a conflict within the system: that of contested ownership.  In these 
situations the video is blocked until the issue can be resolved,27 effectively shutting down 
the video from broadcast.  Sinister claims, yet the current unmonitored system seems to 
allow for the possibility of such occurrences.  And finally, consider a very real situation 
involving local bands and video producers that appropriately license the performance of 
material or catalogues.  It is easy to imagine a local cover band playing a licensed 
performance of a currently popular song and then posting a video on YouTube or 
Facebook.28  Is this video also to be blocked?  While you might assume the answer has to 
be a resounding “YES!” this is not necessarily the case because it depends on the law at 
the place of performance, the place of viewing, the place of posting, and of course, the 
actual license agreement that might have allowed this original performance.29  The band 
 
24
 YouTube even has a YouTube Channel explaining the use of monetization.  See Topic - Monetization, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/channel/HCXXD5Hq6CrX0 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).  
25
 See Audible Magic Technology Overview, supra note 20. 
26
 See id. 
27
 See id.  
28
 See Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About 
Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006) (exploring pro-copyright 
social norms and the jamband community).  In fact, several websites list bands that encourage their fans to 
perform the band’s music and post a video of the recording online.  See Bands That Allow Taping, 
http://btat.wagnerone.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2013); Trade Friendly, ETREE, 
http://wiki.etree.org/index.php?page=TradeFriendly (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
29
 The full parameters of the law are much too large for coverage within this article.  For more 
information see generally AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, 
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/termsdefined.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2013); Giuseppe Mazziotti, New 
Licensing Models for Online Music Services in the European Union: From Collective to Customized 
Management (Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 11-269, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1814264 (examining the restructuring of online rights management within the 
European Union).  
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may have had performance rights, including the right to rebroadcast their rendition of the 
popular song.  However, this information is known to the band, the entity that licensed 
the playing of the song, and few others.  Certainly the technology does not have this 
information and has no mechanism to gather such information.30  As a consequence, a 
local band playing and broadcasting a fully authorized rendition of the song may see their 
video blocked.  Why?  Simple.  The original widely recognized band playing their 
rendition of the song will have tagged their song within the system.  In this situation, the 
system may not be able to distinguish between the two different renditions of the same 
song and may identify the authorized local performance as an infringing activity.  
Without a level of oversight, this video will be blocked, as will all videos that use small 
snippets of songs and similar media well authorized within the fair use doctrine.  An 
automated system cannot make these nuanced legal determinations and as a result will 
over-block media.  It is easy to see why the current system seems to be unready for wide 
scale adoption because there is no real means to untangle these highly important 
determinations without a significant level of context-based decision making.  
¶13  One should not be surprised, however, that digital identification providers have 
created a system that maximizes the persistence, attention, and time commitment of 
intellectual property right holders attempting to protect their rights from online piracy.  
The current system is really a win-win scenario for fingerprinting technology providers 
and right holders.  Digital fingerprinting technology providers use the resources and time 
of intellectual property right holders to upload millions of files, create billions of 
identifiers, and create a very large database of information.  Technology providers’ costs 
arise from designing and maintaining the functionality of the software and are passed on 
to the intellectual property right holders when they elect to use the service.  The burden 
of data entry and maintenance costs of the database are passed on to the right holders, the 
cost of shut down is passed on to the ISPs or intermediaries, and the software 
development company maintains the system but charges the right holders for the ongoing 
use of the software.  
III. STRANGE INCENTIVES IN THE CURRENT ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 
¶14  It is important to recognize the existence of three key stakeholders in the online 
piracy debate: (1) intellectual property right holders; (2) Internet service providers and 
intermediaries; and (3) online users.  Each of these stakeholders is protected in various 
ways, under various laws, on a global scale.  In the majority of instances the law seeks to 
create a balance between the three stakeholders.  However, the current online 
environment, coupled with sometimes outdated existing law, has shifted the balance 
among these three stakeholders in a substantial way.  This balance shift stems from three 
sources: (1) laws that protect ISPs, which were written at a time when the online world 
was less efficient; (2) technology advances that make the online environment much 
faster, smoother, and barrier-free; and (3) growing concern that intellectual property 
rights are being infringed sometimes on a massive scale.  To examine the convergence 
and impact of these issues, this section will examine the law, incentives, and 
 
30
 See Audible Magic Technology Overview, supra note 20. 
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consequences of each in relation to individual users in both the European Union and 
the United States.  
A. The European Stage of Considerations 
¶15  The United States and the European Union have long recognized the need to 
protect ISPs from potential liability arising from parties using their services to infringe 
intellectual property rights.31  Numerous European Union directives exist along these 
lines.  In the United States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act32 provides various and 
more specific protections to ISPs. In both instances, the laws provide protections to 
service providers in many common situations, such as the service provider acting as a 
mere conduit, caching, or hosting material, provided that the ISP does not have actual 
knowledge of unlawful activity.33  However, many of these laws are also allowing ISPs to 
ignore or turn a blind eye to the infringing activities of their users.  
 
31
 While this article will primarily focus on copyright infringement in the online world, there is little 
doubt that numerous areas of intellectual property rights are at issue. See, e.g., Myriam Davidovici-Nora, 
The Dynamics of Co-Creation in the Video Game Industry: The Case of World of Warcraft, 73 COMM. & 
STRATEGIES 43 (2009) (exploring co-creative games); Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? 
Cybersquatting Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 301 (2005) (discussing trademark and cyber-
squatting); Mathias Klang, Avatar: From Deity to Corporate Property - A Philosophical Inquiry into 
Digital Property in Online Games, 7 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 389, (2004) (exploring virtual property); 
Lucille M. Ponte, Preserving Creativity from Endless Digital Exploitation: Has the Time Come for the New 
Concept of Copyright Dilution, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 34 (2009) (discussing trademark and copyright 
dilution); Mathew Rimmer, ‘Breakfast at Tiffany’s’: EBay Inc., Trade Mark Law and Counterfeiting, 21 
J.L. INFO. & SCI. 128 (2011) (exploring the liability of online auction-houses for counterfeiting); Jason 
Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License as a New 
Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2012) (arguing for a greater use of patent protections in the online world); Andrew Sellars, Seized Sites: 
The In Rem Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain Names (May 8, 2011) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1835604 (arguing against the use of domain name seizures); Terry Frieden, 150 




 See generally Orin Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in COPY 
FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Adam Thierer and Wayne 
Crews eds. 2002) (arguing for the realization that there is a logic to the organization and approaches 
contained within the DMCA); Bill Herman and Oscar Gandy, Catch 1201: A Legislative History and 
Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121 (2006) 
(examining the DMCA and circumvention technology); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 
32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 233 (2009) (discussing the DMCA and corresponding safe harbor protections); 
Miquel Peguera, When the Cached Link Is the Weakest Link: Search Engine Caches Under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 589 (2009) (exploring caches under the DMCA); 
Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 363 (2009) (exploring user generated content liabilities under the DMCA); Phil 
Weiser and Gideon Parchomovsky, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2011) (examining fair use 
under the DMCA). 
33
 See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 
200 O.J. (L 178) 12-15. [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].  For a full comparison of the EU laws and the 
DMCA, see generally Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European Counterparts: A 
Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009) (examining the 
similarities and differences between the two legal regimes). 
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¶16  In England, the 2010 cases of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp and Others v. 
Newzbin Ltd34 and Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp and Others v. British 
Telecommunications35 presented a real tipping point after which it was clear that service 
providers had to become cooperative partners in the prevention of online piracy.  The 
Newzbin case36 serves as a perfect example of the difficulties intellectual property right 
holders face when attempting to prevent illegal downloading of material.  Newzbin was a 
content aggregator site that allowed users to search the Internet for locations of a specific 
type of file (NZB).  Similar to a torrent,37 NZB files do not contain the file itself, but 
rather, contain information about the location of the file to be downloaded.  A search 
engine is then used to locate the file or series of files, and once found, the file or files can 
be downloaded and viewed.  The use of torrents and similar types of files has long been 
viewed as a clever way for a website to claim that it is not infringing copyrights because 
the website is doing nothing more than providing links.  The film studios argued that the 
Newzbin site was “focused on piracy in that it locates and categorises unlawful copies of 
films and displays the titles of these copies in its indices; provides a facility for its users 
to search for particular unlawful copies and displays the results; and provides a simple 
one-click mechanism whereby users can acquire unlawful copies of their choice.”38  The 
High Court in London agreed, determining that Newzbin was “liable to the claimants for 
infringement of their copyrights,”39 and in March 2010, the court ordered an injunction to 
restrain Newzbin “from infringing the claimants' copyrights in relation to their repertoire 
of films.”40  As a result, Newzbin was forced to go into administration and the website 
was shut down shortly thereafter.  In this instance, an action against an individual and the 
website he operated resulted in the desired outcome, stopping widespread copyright 
infringement.  Almost unsurprisingly, the website hosts launched a new, yet identical, 
website a short time later, even calling the new website a similar name,41 but this time 
outside the reach of the United Kingdom courts.  Newzbin2, as the new site was known, 
would be available to promote widespread copyright infringement.  This case 
demonstrated to the world that website hosts could easily avoid court shutdown orders by 
merely shifting location.  These shifts were so easy to accomplish that intellectual 
property right holders were left chasing the websites from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
with little hope of ever getting ahead of the game.  To most, the problem was clear: 
copyright-infringing activity was widespread and the courts were limited by national 
boundaries.  The existence of regulatory and enforcement boundaries within the physical 
 
34
 [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Eng.) [hereinafter Newzbin]. 
35
 [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) (Eng.) [hereinafter Newzbin2]. 
36
 See generally Anjanette H. Raymond, Intermediaries’ Precarious Balance Within Europe: Oddly 
Placed Cooperative Burdens in the Online World, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 359 (2013). 
37
 See Gaetano Dimita, Six Characters in Search of Infringement: Potential Liability for Creating, 
Downloading, and Disseminating .torrent Files, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 466 (2012) (describing 
.torrent files). 
38
 Newzbin ¶ 1. 
39
 Id. ¶ 126. 
40
 Id. ¶ 135. 
41
 The Newzbin website page notes: “The site is no longer at this location. It now operates on a different 
domain name. You can use a search engine to find it.”  When following the advice, the website is correct 
that it is easy to locate via a basic Google search: top of the list.  A quick glance of the landing page has the 
most recent episode of ‘The Closer’ at the top of the list.  However, it should be noted there are episodes 
that are not still under copyright protections.  (Correct as of May 19, 2012). 
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world was causing practical issues that left little choice but to ask the boundaryless ISPs 
and intermediaries to become cooperative partners with the intellectual property right 
holders in the prevention of online piracy.  But how should this cooperative burden be 
undertaken and what share of the burden should fall upon ISPs and intermediaries? 
¶17  The November 2011 case of SABAM v. Scarlet Extended42 provides a perfect 
example of the dilemma of online piracy and the balance that must be struck between the 
rights of all in the online world.  In 2004, SABAM43 discovered that subscribers to the 
Belgian ISP Scarlet Extended (Scarlet) were using the ISP's services to illegally 
download, through peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, protected works from its catalogue, 
without authorization and without paying royalties.44  SABAM thus requested that a 
Belgian Court issue an injunction against Scarlet forcing it to block any downloading or 
uploading of illegal files via P2P networks without authorization.45  In June 2007, the 
Brussels Court of First Instance granted the injunction and ordered Scarlet to ensure that 
no copyrighted works were downloaded.  Failing to do so would mean paying a daily 
fine.46  Scarlet appealed the ruling, arguing that imposing an obligation to monitor the 
activities of its users is incompatible with the E-Commerce directive and with 
fundamental rights enshrined within EU law.47  The Brussels Appeal Court proceeded to 
ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) whether EU law precludes an injunction asking 
an ISP to filter for copyrighted content with a view to blocking the transfer of those files, 
including the use of filters as a preventative measure.48  In responding to the question, the 
ECJ went to great lengths to consider the potential conflict between several EU 
Directives concerning information, intermediaries, copyright rights holders,49 and the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
specifically the protection of copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of 
individuals.50  In making its determination, the SABAM court recognized two fundamental 
issues in relation to service providers.  First, the court affirmed existing EU case law and 
academic commentary placing service providers in a position to cooperate with 
intellectual property rights holders in protecting copyright in the online world.  Second, it 
 
42
 Case C-70/10, 2011 E.C.R., available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;?docid=115202&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=fi
rst&part=1&cid=132783 [hereinafter SABAM]. 
43
 One should note I have had to rely upon SABAM and Newzbin2 for the basic summary.  See SABAM, 
supra note 42, ¶¶ 15–28 and Newzbin2, supra note 35, ¶¶ 165–77. 
44
 See SABAM, supra note 42, ¶ 17. 
45
 See id. 
46
 See id. ¶ 21. 
47
 See id. ¶ 28. See infra note 49, for the Directives comprising EU Law.  
48
 See SABAM, supra note 42, ¶ 28. 
49
 See Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. 
(L 167) 10; Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16; Directive 95/46 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; Directive 
2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of 
Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J.  (L 
178) 1; Directive 2002/58 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the 
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 
O.J. (L 201) 37.  
50
 See 2011 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 8, 10. 
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began to establish the balance that must be maintained between a service provider’s 
rights and intellectual property holder’s rights.  Concerning individuals, the court 
highlighted two additional areas of consideration in the creation of the prescribed 
balance: (1) the individual’s right to the protection of his/her personal data, and (2) the 
individual’s freedom to receive or impart information.51  
¶18  In determining the parameters of this balance, the SABAM court declared: “[t]he 
protection of the fundamental right to property, which includes the rights linked to 
intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental 
rights.”52  Fortunately, the court recognized the need to be more proscriptive in such an 
evolving area of law and proceeded to focus on three fundamental rights within the 
European Union that must be considered in creating the balance: (1) the right of business 
to conduct its business,53 (2) the right of an individual to protect personal data,54 and (3) 
the right of an individual to receive and impart information.55  And because the weight of 
each set of rights shifts on a case-by-case basis, one can imagine a scale shifting the 
balance based on the specific facts of the circumstances presented.  
¶19  Concerning the burden that an Internet service provider56 must undertake to 
cooperate in the protections, European domestic courts have already established several 
important factors to be considered in the shifting balance.  In a similar manner to the 
telephone company, Internet service providers should not be expected to undertake 
general monitoring of their customers’ behavior within the EU.57  Even in a situation 
where monitoring activities become less costly,58 an ISP should not be expected to be 
anything more than a provider of a communications service that is in a position to help, 
but should not be burdened by the assertion of intellectual property rights.  Thus far, 
courts have considered the following factors relevant to determining the burden ISPs 
 
51
 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 8, 11, Dec. 7, 2000 (2000 O.J. (C. 
364)) [hereinafter Charter]. 
52
 SABAM, supra note 42, at ¶ 44.  
53
 See id. at ¶ 46, citing Charter, supra note 51 at art.16. 
54
 See Charter, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her”), 
art. 11 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.”).  
55
 The recitals to the E-Commerce Directive note, “the removal or disabling of access has to be 
undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression.” See E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE, 
supra note 33.  
56
 Other courts have considered a different balance. For example, in the US, Judge Posner used a cost-
and-benefit analysis when considering the service providers role in the protection of intellectual property 
rights.  In the case of In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, Judge Posner set forth a “disproportionately 
costly” test, stating: “if the filtering cost is not ‘disproportionately costly as compared with the 
infringement averted,’ ISPs should be required to filter.” In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 
(7th Cir. 2003). 
57
 The Court in L'Oreal SA & Ors v. Bellure NV & Ors specified that national measures which require 
an intermediary provider, such as an ISP, to actively monitor all the data of each of its customers in order to 
prevent any future infringement of intellectual-property rights violate this general monitoring provision.  
See L'Oreal SA & Ors, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535 (Eng.) at 17 citing Directive 2004/48, art. 3 § 2, 
supra note 49. 
58
 The SABAM court specifies that even in the face of less costly measures, the balance would still not 
tip in favor of requiring ISPs to monitor customers’ online activity.  As the court highlights: the injunction 
would require “ISP to carry out general monitoring, something which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of 
Directive 2000/31.” SABAM, supra note 42, at ¶ 40. 
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should bear: cost of implementation,59 cost associated with upkeep, cost associated with 
monitoring,60 level of data inspection required,61 complexity of the system to be 
installed,62 duration of the request,63 and the technical feasibility of such a request.64  
Internet service providers cannot be asked to implement a system that monitors all 
information65 for an unlimited time66 at the exclusive cost of the ISP.
 67  Such a general 
order would place an undue burden on service providers that constitutes a significant 
barrier to the service provider’s core business.
 68  However, according to the court, a 
specific, targeted, and precise injunction requiring the use of an existing technology to 
monitor behavior is a reasonable burden.69  
¶20  But imagine a more wide-scale implementation of the digital fingerprinting 
technology system that places the majority of the burden on the intellectual property right 
holders.  In this situation, there can be little argument for an undue burden being placed 
on the ISP.  In fact, there may be little to no burden on its business.  And while one could 
argue that the implementation of such a system is not in the best interest of ISPs, 
intermediaries, and website hosts as it will undoubtedly impact the number of subscribers 
to the service, one has to appreciate the realities of a shared-cooperative burden to protect 
intellectual property rights online.  While the requested activity cannot unduly burden the 
business, digital fingerprinting technology: (1) places the creation and upkeep costs upon 
the right holder; (2) places implementation costs on the right holder; (3) places costs 
associated with the creation and upkeep of the database on the right holder; (4) places 
few costs upon the service provider as the technology blocks access and there is no legal 
requirement to monitor such activity; (5) requires a low level of data inspection; (6) is 
part of a fairly straight forward, uncomplicated system; and (7) is technically feasible.  In 
this situation it is almost impossible to argue that an undue burden on the service provider 
exists.  Additionally, as I previously described, the right to protect intellectual property is 
balanced against the right to conduct a business.  Once the balance shifts significantly to 
one side of the scale, the resolution is clear: the measure is of such a great benefit that it 
simply must be accommodated by the ISP.  Consequently, the implementation of digital 
 
59
 See id. ¶ 48. 
60
 The Court highlights the installation of the filtering system would require that ISP to “install a 
complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own expense.”  Id. ¶ 48.  
60
 See id. ¶47. 
61
 See Newzbin2, supra note 35, at 162. 
62
 The Court emphasized that the implementation of such a system would also be contrary to the 
conditions laid down in article 3 § 1 of Directive 2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure the 
respect of intellectual-property rights should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly.  See SABAM, 
supra note 42, at ¶ 36 (citing L'Oreal SA & Ors, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 535 at ¶ 139). 
63
 The Court seems unwilling to expect an intermediary to undertake such an expense when the 
“monitoring has no limitation in time, is directed at all future infringements and is intended to protect not 
only existing works, but also future works that have not yet been created at the time when the system is 
introduced.”  See SABAM, supra note 42, at ¶ 37. 
64
 See SABAM, supra note 42, at ¶ 47. 
65




 Id.  The Court emphasizes that the implementation of such as system would also be contrary to the 
conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48 (which requires that measures to ensure the 
respect of intellectual-property rights should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly). 
68
 See SABAM, supra note 42, at ¶ 48. 
69
 Newzbin2, supra note 35, at 177. 
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fingerprinting technology may be something that a national court could order, provided it 
does not run afoul of the restriction on general monitoring.   
¶21  Even without a court injunction, it may be in the best interest of the ISP, 
intermediary, or website host to install a digital fingerprint system.  In the high stakes 
world of content delivery, it is in the best interest of service providers to foster close ties 
with big content creators in order to secure lucrative distribution contracts.  Imagine the 
backlash from the content provider industry if a website gains a reputation as place to 
watch unauthorized streaming of videos, events or sports.  Website hosts that allow 
widespread online piracy will quickly find themselves on the outside of the legal 
streaming industry.  In addition, lawsuits involving large industry players, such as record 
labels or movie distributors, are expensive, time-consuming, distracting, and occurring 
with greater regularity.  These considerations, coupled with aggressive government 
actions such as seizure of domain names for the broadcasting of “live” videos of sporting 
events and television programing, are beginning to create an online world that insists 
upon ISPs policing activities.70  
¶22  Fortunately, the SABAM court did not completely overlook the individual as an 
important stakeholder in the online world.  The court highlights: 
[The blocking] injunction could potentially undermine freedom of information 
since that system might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and 




In the situation of potential over-capture, the court states that the blocking of lawful 
activity might undermine the freedom of information protections enshrined in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.72  Within the E.U. Charter, individuals are 
provided freedom of information73 which, according to international law, can only be 
restricted in certain circumstances: “to protect the rights and reputations of others or to 
protect national security, public order, public health or morals.”74  While this language 
seems remarkably broad, the majority of commentators insist that these restrictions are to 
occur only in the narrowest of circumstances where there is a real risk of harm to a 
legitimate interest.  This language is broadly explained to require that any restrictions be 
 
70
 There are already moves in the E.U. to require ISPs to police the interest for terrorist activities.  Called 
CleanIT, the proposal has far reaching impacts for ISP online policing of the Internet for ‘criminal’ and 
hence allowed policing activity.  See Jillian C. York and Katitza Rodriguez, Cleansing the Internet of 
Terrorism: Leaked EU Proposal Would Erode Civil Liberties, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 
26, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/cleansing-internet-terrorism-leaked-eu-proposal-would-
erode-civil-liberties (discussing the CleanIT system and its potential over-reaching impacts). 
71
 See SABAM, supra note 42; see also Press Release No 126/2011, Court of Justice of the European 
Union, (Nov. 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-
11/cp110126en.pdf (discussing the EU law precludes the imposition of an injunction by a national court 
which requires an Internet service provider to install a filtering system with a view to preventing the illegal 
downloading of files); Press Release No 11/12, Court of Justice of the European Union (Feb. 16, 2012), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-02/cp120011en.pdf (explaining 
that the owner of an online social network cannot be obliged to install a general filtering system, covering 
all its users, in order to prevent the unlawful use of musical and audio-visual work).  
72
 See Charter, supra note 51. 
73
 See id. art. 11. 
74
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19 § 3, Dec. 19, 1966 U.N.T.S. 14668. 
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limited to situations where there is a significant risk of serious and imminent harm with 
close causal link between the risk of harm and the expression.75  While the expression 
does not seem to implicate general expression or posting of communication online, one 
must appreciate that such communication should be considered to fall within the 
provisions.  Moreover, the provisions are especially relevant in relation to the criticism 
and debate concerning public issues, such as those previously highlighted with the 
Democratic National Convention or political rallies/uprisings.  In these situations, 
commentators agree that the law must not be misused to censor criticism and debate of 
public issues.76 
¶23  In addition to the Charter, the EU Personal Data Directive77 and the EU Electronic 
Privacy and Communications Directive78 add to the framework for protecting EU 
citizens’ privacy and personal data.  Most relevant to the issue at hand are those rights 
within the Communications Directive.  Briefly, Member States are prohibited from 
listening to, taping, storing, intercepting, or otherwise conducting surveillance of 
communications79 and related traffic data unless the users have given their consent.80  The 
Directive also contemplates an exception to the monitoring and gathering of information 
in the situations where the adopted legislative measures “constitute[s] a necessary, 
appropriate and proportionate measure for the prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences.”81  Currently, there is no provision defining intellectual 
property right infringements as a criminal offense.82  However, there are several treaties 
and other legal measures currently in discussions that may create a criminal offense in 
these instances.  Should one of these legislative texts be adopted, the Communications 
Directive specifies that Member States may “adopt legislative measures providing for the 
retention of data for a limited period,”83 on the condition that the retention is done in the 
pursuit of criminal offenses.84  While the application of this Directive to the broadcasting 
 
75
 See UNITED NATIONS, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34, ¶¶ 23–33 (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm. 
76
 See id. ¶ 38. 
77
 Directive on The Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31.  
78
 Directive Concerning The Processing Of Personal Data And The Protection Of Privacy In The 
Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L201) 37, as amended by 2006 O.J. (L105) 54 and 2009 
O.J. (L337) 11 [hereinafter ‘Communications Directive’]. 
79
 See id. art. 2 § d.  "Communication" means any information exchanged or conveyed between a finite 
number of parties by means of a publicly available electronic communications service. This does not 
include any information conveyed as part of a broadcasting service to the public over an electronic 
communications network except to the extent that the information can be related to the identifiable 
subscriber or user receiving the information.”  Id. 
80
 See id. art. 5 §1. 
81
 Id. art. 15 § 1. 
82
 This was one of the main issues in the failure of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  
24 June 2011, COM(2011)0380, 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0380:FIN:EN:PDF (visited 14 April 
2013).  Of course, this is not the case in the US.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006) (criminal infringement of a 
copyright).  Nor is it necessarily true when the infringement activity is substantial.  See Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 61, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (requiring signatory countries to 
establish criminal procedures and penalties in cases of "willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy 
on a commercial scale”).   
83
 Communications Directive, supra note 78, art. 15 § 1. 
84
 Id. 
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of video is somewhat doubtful, the provisions may apply to certain types of 
communications that involve online piracy.  In the case that this Directive were to apply 
to the particular medium of communication in question, it seems reasonably clear that 
interception of communications could occur if the party consents or if a criminal offense 
was present in the particular circumstances.  Keep in mind, as previously discussed in 
Part I, a large portion of the Internet activity occurs on or within private sites governed by 
terms of agreement.  In such cases, it is easy to imagine that consent to monitor and 
intercept communications will be present within these agreements. 
¶24  Of course, the recent SABAM case suggests that these questions must be considered 
in light of the prescribed balance considerations.  There is no specific language within the 
discussed texts that suggests that blocking (and storing), for the purposes of assessment 
of the lawfulness of the activity, cannot occur subject to some restrictions.  For example, 
if the blocking was limited in duration, done for the purpose of assessment of the 
lawfulness of the communication, and completed in a timely manner that allows for the 
immediate return of the lawful communication, it might not run afoul of the law.  In fact, 
it may comport to the balance between the intellectual property right holders and the 
individuals’ right to communication, which has become a hallmark of the SABAM case.  
In the situation that a service provider undertook a limited burden or no burden in the 
determination of lawfulness of the communication, the triad would be complete and no 
party would be able to argue against the implementation of a digital fingerprinting 
system.  Of course, this assumes that digital fingerprinting technology can be completed 
relatively quickly, has a means to store the communication while it is assessed, has a 
mechanism to challenge decisions of unlawfulness, and has the ability to restore the 
communication once a determination of lawfulness is completed.  
B. The United States and the DMCA 
¶25  United States courts have faced ISP issues eerily similar to the Newzbin2 and 
SABAM cases.  In the case of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services,85 the Northern District of California found that once the 
copyright holder had put the ISP on notice of the infringing content, the act of providing 
the distribution of the infringement could amount to substantial participation.  In 
language remarkably similar to Newsbin2 and SABAM court language, the California 
court noted: 
Providing a service that allows for the automatic distribution of all Usenet 
postings, infringing and noninfringing, goes well beyond renting a premises to an 
infringer. . . .  Thus, it is fair, assuming Netcom is able to take simple measures 
to prevent further damage to plaintiffs' copyrighted works, to hold Netcom liable 
for contributory infringement where Netcom has knowledge of [the direct 
infringer’s] infringing postings yet continues to aid in the accomplishment of [the 





 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Communic’n Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
86
 Id. at 1375. 
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¶26  In 1995 there were arguments for the standard being: (1) technology that allowed 
distribution and not mere rental of space online, (2) knowledge of infringing activity, and 
(3) the availability of simple measure to prevent the piracy.87  The outcome of this case 
sent shockwaves through ISPs as it seemingly imposed a burden to police the activity of 
its users in order to prevent online piracy.  Failing to undertake simple measures to 
prevent online piracy meant that ISPs would be liable for copyright infringement. 
¶27  In direct response to this potentially broad liability, Congress enacted the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act88 and specifically included a section to protect ISPs from 
liability provided that the ISP takes expeditious action to remove allegedly infringing 
content.89  Similar to the E.U. law, under the DMCA, an ISP can be issued “injunctions 
on such terms as it [the court] may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of 
a copyright.”90  These court injunctions can be directed in two ways: (1)  “restraining the 
service provider from providing access to infringing material or activity residing at a 
particular online site on the provider’s system or network,”91 and (2) “restraining the 
service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service 
provider’s system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is identified in 
the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder that are 
specified in the order.”92  However, in language that does not track current EU law, the 
DMCA limits relief to “the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of 
relief comparably effective for that purpose.”93  This phrase makes clear that the court is 
not asked to perform any type of balance between the various stakeholders.  Instead, 
under the DMCA the service provider may be ordered to undertake the least burdensome 
action that would be ”comparably effective” in ending the infringing activities of the user 
or website activity.  This provision does not consider the total burden on the ISP; instead, 
it prescribes that the selected form of relief be the least burdensome of the relief 
available.  The least burdensome standard is a significant departure from the E.U. 
standard, and it fails to address the issue of the overall burden on the ISP.  
¶28  Moreover, the DMCA specifically prescribes that the burden of investigation is not 
to be placed on the ISP.94  As a result, while the standard is one of least burdensome relief 
 
87
 Id.  
88
 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).  In describing the “dual purpose and balance” of the DMCA, the court in 
Verizon Internet Services highlighted:  
Congress . . . created tradeoffs within the DMCA: service providers would receive liability 
protections in exchange for assisting copyright owners in identifying and dealing with 
infringers who misuse the service providers’ systems. At the same time, copyright owners 
would forgo pursuing service providers for the copyright infringement of their users, in 
exchange for assistance in identifying and acting against those infringers. 
In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp.2d 24, 37 (D.D.C.), rev’d sub nom. Recording Indus. Ass'n 
of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
89
 For an introduction to the background of the drafting of the DMCA, see Jon M. Garon, Tidying Up the 
Internet: Take Down of Unauthorized Content under Copyright, Trademark and Defamation Law, N. KY. 
U. CHASE L. & INFO. INST., Working Paper Series, (March 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029326.  
90
 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006). 
91
 Id. at § 512(j)(1)(A)(i). 
92
 Id. at § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii). 
93
 Id. at § 512(j)(i)(3) (emphasis added). 
94
 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 
512(m) (2006)).  In fact, the court in Aimster noted that this provision of § 512 “represents a legislative 
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of the available relief, no ISP may be ordered to investigate activity in an effort to 
prevent online piracy.  Accordingly, under the DMCA, a service provider with actual 
knowledge or awareness of infringing activity95 can be ordered by the court to: (1) block 
or remove an individual as a customer; (2) block or remove a specific file(s); and/or (3) 
block or shut down a specific website.96  However, unlike E.U. law, a service provider 
cannot be ordered to monitor activity, regardless of the level of specificity of the 
request.97  And any order issued does not need to be done in light of a balance Instead, the 
standard is one of the “least burdensome action” that would be ”comparably effective” in 
ending the infringing activities of the user(s) or website activity.  
¶29  In a significant departure from current E.U. law, the DMCA protects an ISP from 
claims arising from the removal or denial of access to content.  In this instance, the 
language of the DMCA is important to the debate: 
A service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the 
service provider’s good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or 
activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is 
ultimately determined to be infringing.
98
  
¶30  Under the DMCA, the decisive factor is “good faith,” which is a notoriously 
slippery term in all areas of law.  But the real issue here is the absolute protection that 
arises for ISPs acting in “good faith.”  An ISP is protected when it removes material or 
disables access to a website—regardless of the ultimate determination of the lawfulness 
of the material.  In the cooperation focused online world that now contains the marriage 
between service providers and intellectual property right holders, this provision may just 
spell doom for individual stakeholders as their interests will rarely impact practical, 
business-based decisions, especially with the extreme limited liability protections that 
exist for ISPs.   
 
determination that copyright owners must themselves bear the burden of policing for infringing activity — 
service providers are under no such duty.”  In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F.Supp.2d 634, 657 (N.D. 
Ill. 2002), aff'd, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
95
 DMCA recognizes two standards, actual knowledge or awareness, described as “circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) (2006). 
96
 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).  Of course, the ability of a court injunction shutting down a website under 
a DMCA provision is an ongoing issue as the Wikileaks case emphasizes.  See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. 
Wikileaks, 535 F.Supp.2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  The entire case history, including amicus briefs, can be 
found at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/3:2008cv00824/200125/.  
97
 Some argue there is one exception to my assertion, ‘repeat infringers.’ As noted by the court in 
Aimster: 
The [DMCA] provides a series of safe harbors for Internet service providers and related 
entities, but none in which Aimster can moor. . . . The common element of [the DMCA]’s 
safe harbors is that the service provider must do what it can reasonably be asked to do to 
prevent the use of its service by "repeat infringers." 
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 655. 
98
 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).  Of course, there are exceptions to this protection, 
such as that the ISP has to provide notice and allow for challenges to the good faith removal.  Moreover, 
the DMCA also provides that the material must be kept and has to have the ability to be restored.  17 
U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C) (2006). 
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¶31  Without a doubt when this provision was written it was groundbreaking and 
essential for the further development of the Internet.99  It protected ISPs from a new and 
unpredictable digital landscape that included a growing concern for online piracy.  At the 
time, no one could predict how online users would behave and no one wanted to envision 
ISPs being legally responsible for ”facilitating” copyright infringement,100 especially 
when no one really knew if the vast majority of Internet users would engage in non-
infringing uses of the Internet.101  The protection was essential for ISPs.  But such 
protection is now creating issues for ISPs as the speed of communication102 coupled with 
serious advances in hardware and software development have substantially changed the 
online world.  These substantial changes in the online environment have demanded that 
ISPs react with significantly less time to evaluate claims prompting an increased use of 
technology to assist in the assessment function.  
¶32  While the DMCA provides absolute protection in terms of ISP liability, it limits the 
protections by prescribing procedures that ISPs must take in response to a notice of 
infringing activity.  Focus should now be placed on the phrase ‘activity claimed to be 
infringing’ as this is the turning point in terms of digital fingerprinting.  Within the 
practical realities of the system, an intellectual property right holder is able to serve 
notice of infringing activity upon a service provider and the service provider disables 
access and/or removes the material.103  Within the context of current technology, digital 
fingerprinting allows studios and individuals to ”claim” a significant amount of material 
as infringing.  The ability to claim material as infringing is an unfettered one.  
Consequently, the material may be removed even if the material is not within the 
intellectual property portfolio of the entity making the claim, and the ISPs are protected 
from liability provided the take-down action is done in good faith.   
¶33  In some ways it is even more concerning that the law promotes incentives for the 
ISP to take the assertion at face value.  As a result, any claim of infringing activity results 
in the material being removed at least temporarily.  In terms of wrongfully identified 
material, the only mechanism in place to challenge the claim of infringing activity is to 
file a challenge, known as a counter-notification,”104 with the entity that removed or 
disabled access (the service provider).  Under the DMCA, the entity filing the take-down 
notice must then notify the ISP within ten business days that they have filed an action 
seeking a court order to restrain the infringing activity.105  Without a notice of a legal 
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 The Act’s legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to provide service providers with “more 
certainty . . . in order to attract the substantial investments necessary to continue the expansion and 
upgrading of the Internet.”  144 CONG. REC. S11, 889 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
100
 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).   
101
 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).  
102
 Keep in mind that in the U.S. the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230) relieves sites of liability 
for their users' content.  In other words, under CDA 230, only users have legal responsibility over what they 
post.  However, CDA 230 does not apply to intellectual property claims and federal criminal law.  
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230, P.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).  For a 
further discussion of CDA 230 and its possible protections, see Bart Szewczyk, Patrick Carome, & Colin 
Rushing, Online Intermediaries and Third Party Content under EU and US Laws, 83 MEDIA LAW 
RESOURCE CENTER BULLETIN 3, 83–94 (2007) (arguing that Section 230 may be available in the US as a 
defense to a foreign judgment that is inconsistent with Section 230’s protections). 
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 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) (2006). 
104
 See id. § 512(g)(3). 
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 See id. § 512(g)(2)(c). 
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action, the service provider must restore the material within fourteen days.106  Of course, 
this results in the material not being available for a significant period, which is 
concerning when the material in question is part of a stream or a timely debate topic.  
Recall the Hugo awards or the Democratic National Convention.107  These were both 
streamed “next-to-live”; no one wanted to watch a tape-delayed broadcast.  Shutting 
down this stream ended the “next-to-live” broadcast.  Restoring the material at a 
significantly later time is simply not the same to the online community or to the 
advertisers and others drawing a benefit from an engaged first-to-know-the-information 
audience.  This particular mechanism has a serious potential for abuse and may in fact be 
de facto censorship.   
¶34  It is equally concerning that the policies surrounding the use of digital 
fingerprinting technology allow entities to upload and tag information even if the material 
is not within their intellectual property portfolio.  In these situations, the only real means 
to prevent continual flagging of the material is for the rightful holder of the material to 
challenge the “asserted” ownership of the entity uploading the material into the digital 
database.  At this time, most of the digital fingerprinting technology systems do not 
anticipate the need for this protection and many have no mechanism in place to rectify 
this issue.  Consequently, one can appreciate several crucial issues: (1) mere notice of 
infringing activity causes the material to be removed or blocked; (2) for the material to be 
restored, the individual must file a counter-notification claim and then may need to 
succeed in proving ownership or appropriate licensing rights in court; (3) the ISP is 
protected from liability based mainly on the nebulous requirement that it act in “good 
faith”; (4) the entity originally filing the notice suffers no real consequence for notices 
that are inaccurate, poorly researched, or flat-out wrong;108 and (5) there is a lack of 
effective policy governing how oversight of the technology in question and challenges 
to holder rights. 
IV. MINOR ADJUSTMENTS ARE NEEDED IN KEY PROBLEM AREAS 
¶35  As can be gathered from the above comparison, existing legal texts and cases are 
demanding the recognition of a balance of interests between three primary stakeholders: 
(1) the service providers, (2) the right holders, and (3) the individual users.  Within the 
United States, the right holder is protected via a simple notice system, the individual is 
protected with a right of appeal, and the ISP is protected from liability as long as it 
quickly responds to take-down requests.  At the time of drafting, the approach advanced 
by the United States was balanced, basically fair, and provided full coverage.  However, 
today the speed and ease of online communications and other technology advancements 
have created a different online world.  Consequently, the old balances are no longer 
working within the United States: (1) the allegedly infringing material is offline for 
potentially fourteen days—even if it is legal; (2) ISPs are in the position of honoring the 
majority of take-down requests—presented to them in the millions; (3) right holders are 
ready and willing to pay for services that monitor the Internet for infringing material—all 
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 See id. 
107
 See Newitz, supra note 7 and corresponding text; Singel, supra note 7 and corresponding text. 
108
 The notification is submitted under penalty of perjury for inaccurate information, a remedy rarely 
used.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(vi) (2006). 
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while monetization allows infringing material to play so long as you pay; and (4) the law 
allows the use of terms of service to force users to consent to the use of digital 
fingerprinting technology, despite serious issues concerning both the technology and the 
policies that surround its use.  
¶36  In the European Union, the SABAM case has prompted a significantly different 
balance, one that includes the concept of fundamental rights of the stakeholders.  Despite 
a different starting point, the need for a balanced approach to preventing online piracy 
has resulted in essentially the same practical outcome.  ISPs are burdened with a need to 
cooperate in preventing copyright infringement, and as such, they too have turned to 
digital fingerprint technology in an effort to avoid liability for not doing enough to 
prevent online piracy.  While the reason for the use of digital fingerprinting technology 
arises from a different conceptual burden, both the European Union and the United States 
are facing the same set of practical issues in relation to the use of technology.  Digital 
fingerprinting is being used as a “fix” to all that ails.  The technology is allowed as the 
ISPs have no reason to prevent the use of such a system, and the law fails to prevent its 
misuse and/or or the ISPs must protect themselves from liability for doing too little to 
prevent online piracy.  In both instances, digital technology seems to be the adopted cure-
all.  Accordingly, the law must be altered to regulate the use of this technology as the 
system and the policies surrounding its use are not protecting the rights of online users.  
Consequently, the balance between the online stakeholders has been lost.  The question 
then becomes: what adjustments can be made to rectify the imbalance?  
A. EU Cooperative Burdens Are Based on a Narrow Focus  
of the ISPs’ Burdens 
¶37  In contrast to the DMCA, the Sabam case clearly establishes that ISPs have a 
fundamental right to operate their business without an undue burden.109  But what 
constitutes an undue burden?  As the courts continue to struggle with this question on a 
case-by-case basis, some wonder if the burden of protecting intellectual property rights 
placed on ISPs should include considerations of the high volume of activity being 
requested by intellectual property right holders to protect their intellectual property rights.  
For example, Verizon notes that it is often sent automated “take-down” notices by the 
thousands.110  Meanwhile, Google reports it has received 6,312,528 uniform resource 
locators (URLs) removal requests within the past month.111  Given the sheer volume of 
these requests it is worth asking: in examining the proper degree of burden being placed 
on a business, shouldn’t a comprehensive examination of the entire burden be the 
standard?  Certainly the burden on the business is only truly measured when considered 
in light of all of the actions requested by all intellectual property right holders. 
¶38  Google is the perfect example to consider in this debate.  Google is one of the noted 
ISPs that takes a semi-hands-on approach to the online world by complying with some, 
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 See SABAM, supra note 42. See supra notes 36-47 and corresponding text. 
110
 See Deutsch, supra note 22 and corresponding text.  
111
 See Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE (Sept. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/.  This number is not outrageously high.  
See Google Receives 1.5m Takedown Requests a Week, TELEGRAPH ONLINE (Sept. 28, 2012) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/9502877/Google-receives-1.5m-takedown-requests-a-
week.html (discussing the number of take down requests). 
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but not all, take down requests.112  To catch erroneous requests someone—or probably a 
very large team of “someones”—is tasked with considering each request individually.  
But this is troubling in the context of E.U. and U.S. laws, both of which place a high 
value on not burdening ISPs with the protection of intellectual property rights.  Taken 
together, court orders and take down requests create an unfair burden for ISPs.113  The 
need for ISPs to employ individuals or digital technology to police Internet activity is a 
disturbing trend and places too high of a burden on ISPs.114  The creation of a cooperative 
burden of preventing online piracy and advancements in technology are causing ISPs to 
undertake much too great a role in the protection of intellectual property rights.  The law 
and the courts must seek to rebalance the burdens emphasizing the intellectual property 
right holder’s responsibility in terms of identification and enforcement costs.  Within the 
U.S., this can only be accomplished if the law revisits the system of notice-and-take-
down requests and considers the appropriate role and burden of ISPs in evaluating these 
requests.  Within the E.U., the law must begin to envision the burden placed on the ISPs 
beyond a single request and resist the urge to adopt the U.S.-based notice and takedown 
system with adjustments being made for advancing technology.  Finally, the difference 
between U.S. and E.U legislative approaches demonstrates the need to not only update 
the law, but to harmonize the approach to the protection of intellectual property rights 
and the burdens to be placed on Internet providers.   
B. The Existing Legal Regime Breaks Down in Relation to Live Streaming 
¶39  Online video content as a source of communications and commentary is a growing 
reality in the digital age. According to online research institution comScore, 188 million 
U.S. Internet users watched 37.7 billion online content videos in August 2012.115  In fact, 
this is the highest number of Internet users reported to be watching online video content 
within a given month.116  Yet, despite the significant rise in online video content delivery 
and the certain corresponding increase in live streaming, the law has failed to adequately 
adjust to advancement in these delivery methods.  
¶40  The notice-and-take-down regime created by the DMCA allows copyright holders 
to send a notice to an online hosting service when they find their copyright being 
violated.117  The online service then removes the content.  However, there is nothing 
within the law that places a time limit on the response.  Instead the timeframe is one of 
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 For example, senior copyright counsel at Google, Fred von Lohmann, reports that Google attempts to 
“catch erroneous or abusive removal requests” and in doing so does not honor all requests for removal.  See 
Fred von Lohmann, Transparency for copyright removals in search, GOOGLEOFFICIALBLOG (May 24, 
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”expeditious” removal.118  Unsurprisingly, response times vary under this loose standard.  
For example, Google reports that it takes an average of 11 hours to respond to take-down 
requests.119  But few live streaming events last longer than a few hours and few take place 
over eleven hours.  As a result, live streaming almost always escapes the reach of a shut-
down request.  On the other hand, if a live stream event is taken down, the user who 
posted it has no immediate recourse to have the video restored.  Instead, the user must file 
a counter-notice and wait for approximately 14 days.120  The usefulness and marketability 
of the live stream is all but eliminated in these circumstances.  Consequently, at a 
minimum the law needs to be updated to better accommodate advancements in 
broadcasting and communications technology. 
C. A Party with Skin in the Game is Making All the Final Decisions 
¶41  An ISP that must adjudicate between the removal of content that is allegedly illegal 
and exposure of its own liability will tend to remove the content that has been flagged for 
removal.121  However, this is not always the case.  As previously discussed, Google has a 
team in place to review take-down requests and decide which should be honored.  The 
online community is fortunate to have ISPs willing to take up the mantle of balancing the 
interests of intellectual property right holders and individual users, especially since the 
undertaking causes them to incur a great amount of cost and potential liability.  However, 
no regime as important as this should rely upon the good faith of a business, especially 
when the business making the determinations has such a large stake in the 
determinations.  In contrast, not every service provider is able, or willing, to take on a 
task associated with such a high cost and potentially significant liability.  
¶42  More concerning is the absence of regulation, guidance, or other information that 
assists ISPs in making these determinations and/or guidance that places restrictions upon 
the factors that can be used to make such determinations.  While most commentators 
highlight Google’s informal corporate motto ”Don’t Be Evil”122 as reflective of intent to 
balance stakeholder interests in the online world, one can appreciate that not all entities 
making decisions subscribe to this corporate philosophy.  And even when service 
providers subscribe to Google’s philosophy, these determinations are often subjective and 
are thus open to great debate in terms of meaning and practical application.123  Without a 
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level of guidance and/or regulation service providers are left to their own devices to make 
these determinations.  It is not hard to imagine that they might be based on hidden 
agendas, secret algorithms, and future business desires.  While there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this self-regulatory approach, some level of guidance is certainly needed to 
protect individual’s fundamental rights.  Consequently, there is a desperate need for a 
level of guidance on the design and implementation of the response to take-down 
requests that insists upon considerations being given to the protection of all stakeholders. 
D. The Current System Over-Captures/Identifies Online Material Without 
Providing Appropriate Protections 
¶43  As discussed extensively above, the problem of over-capture/identification of 
information is a growing problem as technology is being used as a mainstream effort to 
fight online piracy.  This problem is exacerbated since the law does not provide for 
protection of an individual’s information/communications.  Although the US does 
provide protections when an individual’s information/communication is removed from a 
website,124 no law in the E.U. or U.S. provides protections when an entire website is 
blocked.  As argued by the attorneys for Kyle Goodwin in the Megaupload case, United 
States vs. Kim Dotcom:125  
It is one thing to take legal action against an alleged copyright infringer.  It is 
quite another to do so at the expense of entirely innocent third parties, with no 
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¶44  The absence of protections in terms of the information that is lawfully stored on a 
website is a troubling gap in the current legal regime.  In the absence of legal 
proscriptions, the harmed party needs to seek the assistance of the court to craft the 
necessary protections.  At a minimum, one would expect that the court would require: (1) 
that a filtering or similar system would be set up to return to the rightful owner any 
information/contents or communications that are clearly not the subject of an intellectual 
property right holder claim against the website/user; (2) the ability of the individual that 
stored or transmitted the information to demonstrate the contents are of a lawful 
use/activity; and (3) the safekeeping of the information until any issues are resolved.  But 
again, these protections would need to be delineated by the court and are not prescribed 
as a matter of law.  This leaves individual users at a significant disadvantage when a 
website is shut down as their information is no longer available and there is often no time 
frame for the restoration of the website or the return of the material.  Moreover, any 
actions in relation to the material would result in costs to the storage providers, in terms 
of both storage and filtering of lawful material.  Thus, laws need to be designed to ensure 
that information is protected, that retrieval of lawful information is possible, and that the 
costs associated with these actions are appropriately considered within 
the overall balance.   
E. The System is Automated with No Common Sense Button 
¶45  As discussed above, numerous digital fingerprinting technology providers use a 
system that is fully automated.  But while technology can make many determinations, 
there are always legal grey areas within overlapping and divergent legal regimes that 
demand a level of context-based judgments.  Recall the Hugo Awards and the NASA 
Mars landing video,127 both of which should have been allowed to continue to be live 
streamed, yet were shut down.  As the technology currently functions, it: (1) over 
captures information and communications; (2) is biased in favor of mere assertions of 
intellectual property rights holders; (3) has no oversight concerning data entry; and (4) 
uses little to no human intervention or context based determinations in the take-down 
process.  Possibly most concerning is the use of a system that automatically removes 
information without the ability for a level of human intervention, decision making, and 
discretion in light of the circumstance.  In instances such as the Hugo Awards, the system 
must have a ”common sense button”128 that allows the video, audio file, or stream to 
continue to be available, despite an automated shut down response.  Moreover, the entity 
or entities making the shut-down determinations must be protected under the law.  These 
protections must exist regardless of their determination of the lawful or unlawful nature 
of the material, provided the decision is made in good faith with a level of human 
intervention.  This protection would shield ISPs from liability, from right holders and 
 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/04/megaupload-data-flap/ (discussing the delay in the decision in 
relation to the release of data).  As of Sept. 27, the New Zealand Prime Minster has apologized to Kim 
Dotcom, and the MegaUpload site may relaunch soon.  See Matt Burns, New Zealand Prime Minister 
Apologizes To Kim Dotcom As Megaupload Nears Relaunch, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/27/new-zealand-prime-minister-apologizes-to-kim-dotcom-as-megaupload-
nears-relaunch/ (discussing New Zealand perceived failure to support Dotcom against the legal claims). 
127
 See Newitz, supra note 7 and corresponding text; Singel, supra note 7 and corresponding text. 
128
 See Higgins, supra note 7 and corresponding text. 
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individuals,129 and allow for the return of a balance between the two often conflicting 
stakeholder interests. 
F. The System is Easily Abused 
¶46  A common and ongoing problem with the existing digital fingerprinting technology 
occurs in the policy that allows for ”alleged” intellectual property right holders to upload 
material and tag it within the system without verification or authentication of legally 
recognized intellectual property rights.  Unfortunately, the tendency of some right holders 
to over claim information is not one that is unique to the digital fingerprinting technology 
and as such, it is not really surprising that protections must be put in place to prevent 
attempts to over claim rights.  For example, in the cases of CPI v Robinson,130 Twentieth 
Century Fox v Newzbin,131 and Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecoms132 the plaintiffs 
encountered great difficulty in proving intellectual property rights that were essential to 
the furtherance of the proceedings.  In each of these cases, the court refused to grant a 
wide injunction covering material that was not clearly within the ownership or exclusive 
license of the party seeking the injunction.  But of course, these cases arose within the 
court system, and as such, a level of oversight prevented the abusive practice of over 
claiming.  It is therefore concerning that no oversight is included within digital 
fingerprinting technology systems and that no jurisdiction places a legal requirement 
upon the system to prevent this type of abuse.  In fact, the majority of systems fail to 
allow the rightful owner or exclusive license holder to contest wrongful claims of 
ownership.  As such, the system is ripe for abuse and does not provide the necessary 
protections that right holders are entitled to expect.  
¶47  Moreover, the law fails to penalize those that make wrongful or erroneous claims 
of intellectual property rights and/or those that file wrongful or erroneous take-down 
requests.  The law places too high of reliance upon the honest nature of those entities that 
file take-down requests, a status that they no longer deserve.  The advancement of 
technology and the ability to file simple online forms has created a notice-and-takedown 
system that rewards entities that over-file claims.  The entities make these claims with 
full knowledge that the system is either automated and thus will implement requests 
without oversight or that they are human decision based systems overloaded with 
requests.  This results in a serious abuse of the system by a single stakeholder.  Instead, 
the system should require a level of oversight and should penalize those entities that 
abuse the system.    
 
129
 Unfortunately, this would not protect ISP or the individuals that run them from the actions of a 
government official.  Consider the issue in light of the Brazilian arrest of the head of Google’s operations in 
Brazil for failure to remove YouTube videos that attacked a mayoral candidate.  See Jeff Fick & Amir 
Efrati, Brazil to Arrest Google’s Local Chief, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444813104578018673571930046.html (describing the 
initial order in response to the websites refusal to honor a court order requiring the removal of video); Adi 
Kamdar, Shooting the Messenger: The Misfortunes of Google Brazil and the Need for Intermediary 
Protections, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 26, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/shooting-messenger-brazil (describing the full order, which also 
included a 24-hour shut down of Google and YouTube). 
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G. The Online User is Often Forgotten and Without Legal Protections 
¶48  When considering the need for protections and new legislative initiatives, one 
online stakeholder’s interest that has been historically forgotten and must begin to draw 
the attention of the drafters: the individual users.  Individual users need to be concerned 
that they are forgotten, as the law currently creates odd burdens and strange incentives 
that continue to ostracize these stakeholders.  Without appropriate legal protections, 
Internet users will face a growing battle as the legal incentives133 that encourage ISPs to 
create these systems which will continue to over identify and capture information.  The 
reason behind this is simple.  The online world where we post, publish, store, and 
communicate is provided by private entities.  In most cases, these private entities can and 
do regulate our online behavior via the use of a detailed user/terms of service agreements, 
with few restrictions.  These terms of service agreements regulate everything from what 
can be posted, to the service provider’s response to the posting of inappropriate or 
infringing material.  There is really nothing to prevent ISPs, intermediaries, and website 
hosts from implementing terms of service that include the use of digital fingerprinting 
technology to identify material.  It will simply be a condition of storing and posting 
material, and generally using the Internet.  However, as discussed above, the technology 
is fraught with issues, and the policies surrounding the use of the technology are often 
significantly one-sided in favor of the purported holder of the intellectual property right.  
As individual users we need to be concerned, the newly created cooperative burden 
placed on service providers and intermediaries has shifted the balance in the online world 
into an odd marriage between service providers and intellectual property right holders.134  
And this shift can and will be supported via the terms of service agreements widely 
imposed upon the online community.  The law and the legal protections enshrined within 
it envisioned a much different balance within the online community.135  Fortunately, 
individual users as important stakeholders are beginning to garner attention as 
demonstrated by the European Court of Justice’s case of SABAM v Scarlet Extended.136  
None of these laws go far enough to protect individuals, however, as the incentives for 
ISPs to assist in policing the Internet for online piracy are simply too great at this time.  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶49  The United States and the European Union have long recognized the need to 
protect ISPs from potential liability arising from customers using their services to 
infringe intellectual property rights.  The full parameters of these protections is being 
revisited by the courts as it has recently become clear that ISPs are in the best position to 
cooperate in the prevention of online piracy.  The expectation of cooperation between 
intellectual property right holders and ISPs is creating an odd marriage of interests that 
frequently excludes considerations of the online rights of individuals.  Moreover, the law 
has not yet accommodated the expectation of cooperation, and as such, ISPs will be 
subject to lawsuits from intellectual property right holders for not responding to take-
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down/shut-down requests.  Furthermore, ISPs will be pursued by individuals for a failure 
to protect their information from reactionary measures demanded by right holders.  This 
is an untenable situation that the law was specifically designed to prevent.  Yet, the 
creation of a cooperative burden places service providers in a ”try it out and wait and see” 
situation, hoping for the best but fearing the worst in terms of liability.  The response is 
predictable; return some of the burden to intellectual property right holders by allowing 
them to use technology to identify infringing activity online.  However, the technology is 
not yet ready for wide scale use and is often accompanied by policy that allows over 
claiming of material in an effort to increase monetization.  Again, a wrong set of 
incentives has created a poor response to online piracy.  The law must react to these odd 
incentives arising from the creation of a cooperative policing burden being placed on the 
ISPs and must do so in a way that ensures all online stakeholders’ rights are protected.  
The balance can only be restored by: (1) ensuring that ISPs are not burdened under the 
sheer weight of requests to protect intellectual property; (2) ensuring that ISPs are 
protected from liability arising from an ISP’s unwillingness to honor a takedown request 
when the takedown request is clearly overreaching, or suffers from similar defect; (3) 
ensuring that the use of technology is employed with a level of oversight; (4) ensuring 
that any technology employed recognizes and provides appropriate avenues to contest 
wrongful claims of ownership and/or licensing rights; (5) ensuring that penalties exist and 
are enforced for the wrongful filing of take-down requests, or similar actions; and, (6) 
ensuring that the law is designed with an eye toward an ever growing use of streaming 
and other high speed communication and broadcasting technology.   
